On Jan 1, 9:47 am, Ste <ste_ro...@hotmail.com> wrote:
[Snipping for length]
> 
>>> I knew you'd say that. But the truth is that what I'm positing about a
>>> symmetry of fundamental forces is a scientific theory, in that it
>>> can theoretically be tested against the material world.
> 
>> Where is the experimental test that distinguishes this theory from the
>> currently held thinking?
> 
> More to the point, why is current thinking more legitimate than this
> theory, if by definition the observations are consistent with either
> theory?

But this is the precisely the point I'm making. In science, competing
models are judged on the basis of where they make DIFFERENT
predictions of measurable phenomena, and then experiments are set up
to determine which of the two made the better prediction.

Science really doesn't give a damn about two models that make
completely identical predictions about everything in their domain of
application. There is no sensible basis (in science) for favoring one
model over the other in that event. There is in fact no such case in
history where there have been two models that have made identical
predictions and claimed a common domain of application.

> 
>> Well, first of all, I would say it at best does a swap of one exotic
>> prediction for another. For example, you claim that symmetry will only
>> be restored long after humans are dead and gone, and so the
>> experimental test of that appears to be inaccessible. This is not
>> exotic?
> 
> I would say it is not exotic in that it doesn't resort to anything but
> the fundamental mechanisms that we are already able to observe.

That is, it is favored because it is familiar?

> The
> only way humans would be able to survive a full run of the whole
> system would be to exist outside of that system, but of course the
> real question then is why such an impossibly high burden of proof is
> being placed on my hypothesis, while the same burden is not placed on
> existing thinking.

The same burden IS placed on existing thinking. Where do you think it
is not?

> 
>> Secondly, nature is no more exotic than what it really is. There is
>> nothing in current theories that should be taken as "difficult" to
>> swallow, as long as it matches what is seen in experiment or makes
>> predictions that can be tested in the foreseeable future.
> 
> Indeed there was nothing "difficult" about the geocentric model.
> Except, of course, the model itself.

And the fact that it lacked predictive power. It only had
postdictive power. This is the difference between a theory and an
empirical fit. The heliocentric model had predictive power where the
geocentric model with epicycles did not. This is what an epicycle
means -- it is a postdictive FIT to additional data, so that the
model changes to accommodate the new data. The advantage of the
heliocentric model is that the model did not have to change with the
addition of data.


> 
>> I'm sorry, but your interpretation of time is not the relativist
>> interpretation of time. I've already mentioned some aspects of the
>> relativist interpretation (fast and future light cones, for example)
>> which you find hard to swallow. Your interpretation is your own and
>> needs to have a new label rather than appropriating one reserved for
>> something else.
> 
> Well I don't really want to get into a long argument simply about what
> to call my interpretation. But there is nothing about the light cone
> model that is time-relative. On the contrary, it implicitly requires
> the classical model of time in order to understand, and the classical
> model of time is not a relative model of time.

No, it doesn't. I think you are confused about what relativity means
and says. You are under the impression somehow that relativity should
insist that past and future light cones should be symmetric ACCORDING
TO principles of relativity, when it does no such thing.

> 
> To reillustrate the difference, the classical model of time measures
> events by reference to their distance from a common past event, not by
> reference only to the time-separation between the two events being
> compared. The classical model requires an absolute benchmark (the
> birth of Jesus, for example), the relative model does not.

I'm afraid you're mistaken. Would you like a decent reading reference
on introductory relativity so you can learn what relativity really
says, rather than continuing this string of misapprehensions?

> 
> The light cone model does not work without classical time (and the
> conversions required for different frames of reference).
> 
> Personally I would utilise a different model to describe what the
> light cone model attempts to describe. I would simply draw a sphere of
> radius r around some point in space, and the radius determines the
> time interval required for events at the central point to be observed
> at the periphery (or the other way around).

This is what a light cone IS. I think you should start by reading up a
little on relativity first.

> That's a somewhat
> different model, but it illustrates the same principle, and unlike the
> light cone model, one can draw the whole "light-globe" model by
> reference to the 3 dimensions that everyone is familiar with.
> 
> Of course, I'm happy to discuss the implications of this with you, but
> I expect the discussion can be moved forward by you actually
> discussing it, not by telling me that I don't understand and that I
> need to learn more.

This is the point where I politely let you know that a newsgroup is
not a place to get a general education about relativity or about
physics. It is well-suited to answering specific and tightly
constrained questions, or for discussing fine points, or for relaying
buzz about interesting news in the field. However, once it becomes
clear that a poster is just lacking in background, this no longer is
the forum for correcting that problem. At that point, what experienced
and informed posters here do (which included a fair number of
practicing physicists) is to recommend good reading resources for that
background material.

> 
>>> It's actually
>>> conceptually simpler, and wipes away the exotic (and generally
>>> paradoxical) predictions of wormholes, classical time travel,
>>> singularities, etc.
> 
>> What do you think is paradoxical about wormholes and singularities?
> 
> I should clarify that I refer to "singularities" in their meaningful
> sense where the laws of physics apparently break down, not just in the
> sense of "a lot of matter in a small space" - I know in recent years
> though the meaningful sense has been largely tempered into the trivial
> sense.

And there is nothing paradoxical about the boundary where the laws of
physics "apparently break down". That's just the boundary beyond which
we don't have much of an idea of what's going on.

> 
> Wormholes are paradoxical simply because they suggest movement in
> space can be achieved without a commensurate amount of acceleration
> (and therefore without the expected level of energy input).

And what is paradoxical about that? A paradox is where there are two
statements made by a theory that are in direct conflict.
Are you under the impression that physics includes a statement that
motion in space MUST be achieved with a commensurate amount of
acceleration (and therefore without an expected level of energy
input)?

Please be careful to distinguish "paradoxical" from "conflicts with my
own expectations about what should be true".

> Of course,
> again, no doubt the concept will be tempered in due course to point
> out that such a wormhole would require an equal or greater amount of
> energy than traditional acceleration (thus robbing the concept of all
> real meaning).

Why would it rob the concept of all real meaning? Are you under the
impression that the MEANING of a wormhole is "travel for cheap and
easy"? Where other than comic books would you get that impression?

> 
>> And relativity does not admit classical time travel, and I don't know
>> where you got the idea it did.
> 
> I never said relativity did - on the contrary, I've been repeatedly
> being saying quite the opposite, as you can observe from my previous
> posts.

Then you and relativity are not in disagreement on this point. Time
travel into the past is not permitted by current physics either.
Therefore, lodging the possibility of time travel as a complaint
against current physics is simply a misplaced accusation.

> 
> I have said that existing interpretations of time, that which I am now
> consistently referring to as "classical time", require a navigable
> dimension of time in the sense that "going backwards" in time means
> restoring the universe to a previous state (and, of necessity,
> observed change implies that time is moving forward). Whereas my
> relativistic time says that "going backwards" is what happens to the
> astronaut in the twins paradox, and "going forwards" is what happened
> to the homebody, even though by classical time both went forwards
> (because neither returned to a previous state).

I'm not really interested in "your" relativistic time. I'd rather
clear up your misapprehensions about what relativity says about
relativistic time.

> 
> I'm sure you're sensible enough PD to see the radical differences
> between those models, and regardless of what you think personally I'm
> sure you'll accept that most physicists, when they think of time,
> still necessarily think of time in classical terms, where the past and
> future continue to exist in some material sense.

??? I have no idea what you mean by "continue to exist in some
material sense", nor do I have any idea where you got the notion that
most physicists think of it in that way.


> 
>> That's the nice thing about experimental evidence. It's usually pretty
>> unambiguous.
> 
> Surely you can't be serious?

As an experimental physicist, I'm quite serious. Here's how it works.
In model A, circumstance set C are predicted to produce a measurable
outcome X in quantity QA.
In model B, circumstance set C are predicted to produce a measurable
outcome X in quantity QB, where QB is different than QA.
Then in experiment, the circumstance set C is set up, and outcome X is
measured with sufficient precision to discern whether the measurement
agrees with QA and disagrees with QB, or agrees with QB and disagrees
with QA.

Then the measurement quite unambiguously distinguishes model A from
model B.

This comparison can be extended to more than two models where they all
predict measurably different outcomes QA, QB, QC, and so on.

In some cases, a given experiment is sufficient to rule out, say,
model A, but cannot discern models B and C, because QB and QC are too
close together for that measurement to distinguish them. In such a
case, then the models are reapplied this way:

In model B, circumstance set D are predicted to produce a measurable
outcome Y in quantity QB'.
In model C, circumstance set D are predicted to produce a measurable
outcome Y in quantity QC', where QB' is different than QC'.
Then in another experiment, the circumstance set D is set up, and
outcome Y is measured with sufficient precision to discern whether the
measurement agrees with QB' and disagrees with QC', or agrees with QC'
and disagrees with QB'.

In this fashion, the body of experimental evidence, including the
tests under circumstance sets C and D, determines which of the three
models survives.

It's absolutely straightforward. I'm a little surprised you thought it
was more ambiguous than this.

> 
>> It's a common misconception among hacks and hobbyists that any
>> experimental data can be "interpreted" to support any model desired.
>> (And Ptolemy and Copernicus are used as the neophyte example.)
> 
> I don't agree that data can be interpreted to support any model, but
> usually a number of models can be conceived to fit the data, at least
> superficially.

See above.

> And anyway, as Einstein said, "it is the theory that
> determines what you can observe" - by which of course he did not mean
> the observation itself changes, only the interpretation of it.

Einstein's comment is off the wall and often misinterpreted to mean
something that just about every physicist would vociferously disagree
with.

> 
>>> And although I don't know what specific cosmological evidence you
>>> refer to, I have of course heard a number of conclusions drawn from
>>> what has been observed in the cosmos. I've heard for example that
>>> matter at the edge of the universe is moving outwards at more than the
>>> speed of light.
> 
>> Relative to us, yes. Is there a problem?
> 
> Yes, insofar as matter is not supposed to be able to accelerate beyond
> the speed of light. Or have I misunderstood, in that two objects
> accelerating in diametrically opposite directions at .6c will appear
> relative to each other to be accelerating at 1.2c?

OK, this is where your thin background is showing through.
First of all, the statement that nothing can be observed to be
traveling at faster than c is a LOCAL statement or a statement that
applies in flat space only. If you'd like to have that misconception
cleared up, I might suggest an article for layfolk in Scientific
American from Feb 2005, which I'm sure you can find at the local
library.
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=misconceptions-about-the-2005-03

Secondly, yes, in a frame of reference two objects that are receding
from each other at 0.6c will have a closing velocity of 1.2c in that
frame. (Please don't confuse acceleration and velocity. That's a
freshman error.) However, that does NOT mean that in the reference
frame of one of those objects, the other object will have a relative
velocity of 1.2c. There is a careful and physical distinction between
closing velocity and relative velocity in physics, and moreover,
closing velocity is not a frame-independent quantity -- it changes
values when you change reference frames.

> In that case one
> can see that the maximum apparent speed of matter is 2c, but it's
> actual speed can be limited to c.

Physics doesn't deal with "real" and "apparent" quantities. It deals
with measured quantities.

> 
>>> I've heard that energy goes into black holes and never
>>> comes out.
> 
>> Aside from radiation, yes. Is there a problem?
> 
> Only insofar as the exception of radiation would disprove the
> hypothesis that nothing ever comes out.

Not so. The theory of relativity doesn't say that nothing comes out.
Comic-book explications of relativity say so. But relativity fully
affords the prospect of radiation emerging. It's been calculated by
the theory, in fact.

> 
>>> Etcetera. But let us assume for one moment that matter at
>>> the edge of the universe is not moving outwards at more than the
>>> speed of light, and let us assume that energy that goes into black
>>> holes is not lost forever. What part of existing theory has to give
>>> to allow those assumptions to be correct?
> 
>> What evidence would support such a proposition?
> 
> The real scientific question, surely, is what observation is not
> compatible with it? (Although I take your point that matter can appear
> to be travelling at more than c without actually doing so.)

As I pointed out earlier, two theories that make exactly the same set
of predictions in the same domain are not competitive.

> 
>> Note that the claim about the mass at the edge of the universe is
>> supported by DATA.
> 
> I know. That is why I mentioned it.
> 
>> Note that there are gravitational objects that are absorbing huge
>> amounts of energy and mass and do not shine, as seen in direct
>> observation.
> 
> Agreed. The question, then, is how does the energy come out again? And
> the answer is EMR. Matter goes in, EMR comes out.

No, it does NOT. That's what "shine" means.

> 
>> What is the point of diddling with countersuppositions, when the
>> current suppositions are supported by experimental data?
> 
> The point is to advance our understanding and simplify our models. If
> an impossibly high burden of proof is placed on every theory that
> challenges the incumbent theory, then you become a prisoner of your
> preconceptions, and commit yourself to adding epicycles forever.

What epicycles? Again, you misunderstand that term.

And the burden of proof is not impossibly high. I've already described
above how theories compete and how they are judged. That might come as
a surprise to you.

> 
> Because of course whenever anyone implores science to adopt a
> conceptually simpler model with aspects that cannot be observed except
> in the fullness of time, the response comes back simply "our existing
> model is adequate for what we already observe".

"Conceptually simpler" or "embraces nothing that I find confusing" is
not a value proposition in physics.
It is being able to make distinguishing predictions of measurable
phenomena that are different than other theories that counts in
science. Sorry, but that's what it is.

> 
> And then the question really is why people accept complex models that
> have a tight fit with existing observations, rather than simple models
> that fit what already has been observed, and which purport to fit all
> that will ever be observed?

There is nothing complex about the current models. It's plain that
you've not been exposed to the current models more than superficially,
so you really haven't been given the opportunity to judge properly.

> 
> I hope you realise PD that the difference is not between "scientists"
> and "non-scientists", it's between scientists who insist on only
> adding to existing models, and scientists who insist on challenging
> existing models.

And I've already told you how that challenge is mounted: by making
distinguishing predictions of measurable outcomes.

> 
>>>> Entropy is related to the
>>>> number of available microstates. The energy of a closed system can
>>>> remain completely constant and the entropy increase nonetheless.
> 
>>> I'm afraid I don't agree.
> 
>> Then I suggest you take a course in thermodynamics to learn what the
>> definition of entropy is.
> 
> Let me start with the OED definition then: "A thermodynamic quantity
> that represents numerically the extent to which a system’s thermal
> energy is unavailable for conversion into mechanical work".
> 
> The first question is, "unavailable for conversion" by whom?

I see. So the basic problem is that your exposure to what entropy is,
is limited to dictionary definitions and so you naturally have open
questions. Has it occurred to you that open questions is not innate to
the subject matter but is instead a feature of your limited material?

Unavailable for conversion means by ANY physical process, human-
involved or not. This includes processes in the sun, at galactic
centers, in plant cells, cosmic rays, whatever.

> Unavailable for conversion by humans? Or unavailable for conversion by
> the fundamental forces of nature?

The latter.

> 
>>> Clearly there many fundamental phenomena
>>> that can only exist in discrete states. An electron, for example,
>>> apparently has a discrete level of charge. If you have a closed system
>>> in which fundamental forces never tire or wear out, and in which there
>>> is energy that can only take discrete forms, and in which states can
>>> only change at a finite speed, then entropy can't increase - you get
>>> an oscillation of states, or a rotation of states.
> 
>> I didn't say there weren't closed systems where entropy didn't stay
>> constant.
> 
> Of course you didn't, because that would have contradicted the 2nd
> law.
> 
>> What is true is that in closed systems, entropy doesn't DECREASE.
>> And what is also true is that in many closed systems, entropy DOES
>> increase.
> 
> That is false, because you have never observed a closed system.

We've already discussed this. You have some misapprehensions about the
application of models.
Consider Newton's first law, which describes the behavior of objects
that are under the influence of zero net force. By your measure,
this law would never be applicable and therefore would be a completely
empty statement. Scientists vigorously disagree.
The same goes for the laws of Mendelian genetics, which NEVER strictly
apply. Are those empty laws?

> 
>>> Like the kinetic balls toy - without friction, the mechanism would
>>> never tire, because gravity never tires, and the momentum of the balls
>>> would always be conserved. The only reason the mechanism does tire is
>>> because it is not a closed system (and in any event the toy is not
>>> designed to be in balance with all the fundamental forces of nature).
> 
>> That's not entirely correct. I don't know what you think is going on
>> in that system that causes it to wind down.
> 
> A number of things cause that system to wind down (i.e. lose
> momentum). Off the top of my head I would say mainly air resistance
> (i.e. friction) - although I don't discount sound, heat, plastic
> deformation, chemical change, etc. But I'm willing to be shocked, if
> you have news for me.

The influence of air and losses to sound can be removed by putting
Newton's cradle in a vacuum. You will find that the balls still wind
down, though not as quickly.

This tells you that the case with the air present is not a closed
system unless the air is included in the system. And then, of course,
the entropy of the system increases, though the momentum and energy of
the system does not.

In the vacuum case, there are conversions of translational kinetic
energy into thermal, stochastic kinetic energy (which increases the
temperature of the balls). Again, energy and momentum are conserved,
while entropy increases.

> 
>>> Thinking scientifically I suppose the problem with testing this
>>> hypothesis is that a closed system is unmeasurable by those outside
>>> it, and incomprehensible to those within it. In this way, closed
>>> systems can theoretically exist, but are untestable.
> 
>> That's also wrong.
>> There are two ways this can be done.
>> One is that the measuring device be INCLUDED in the system, and the
>> entropy change of that device is included in the closed system sum.
> 
> But even that requires the measuring device to be loaded with
> information gleaned from outside the system itself. And then the
> system must be opened, first to add the measurement device, and then
> again to gather data from the measuring device.

Yes, and those end effects can be accounted for. Note that the
measuring device can be set to only record during the interval while
the boundary is not breached.

> 
>> The other way is to prepare a state and then close the system, let a
>> process operate, and then open the system and measure its final state.
>> This can be done in such a way that the end-effects can be accounted
>> for.
> 
> But then you didn't measure a closed system. You measured an open
> system - the system was open at the start when the initial state was
> set, at at the end when the measurement was taken. A "closed system"
> that is not closed for all time is not in fact a "closed system" at
> all.

And that's nonsense. There is nothing in the definition (except your
own) that a closed system is closed for eternity.

> 
>> Why is increasing entropy epicyclic again?
> 
> Increasing entropy isn't the epicycle. Increasing entropy is the false
> assumption. It is the false assumption that necessitates epicycles in
> the whole body of theory, in order that there can be functional
> movement around the false assumption.

Increasing entropy between two states A and B is not an assumption. It
is a MEASURED QUANTITY. Entropy is MEASURABLE.

What epicycles in the whole body of the theory? I see none.
> 
>> I just said that the universe is
>> not the only closed system for the purposes of experimental test.
> 
> I see. This is clearly one point on which we disagree. I am not aware
> of any such experimental closed system. At the very least, this closed
> system would have to exclude the forces of gravity and
> electromagnetism (note I say "exclude", not "overcome" or
> "disregard").

Not so! See my comment about Newton's first law above first of all.
Secondly, your notion of closed system is not the same as what
physicists mean by the therm.

> Secondly it would have to have been closed, and remain
> closed, for all time.

This again is NOT the meaning of "closed system" as used by
physicists. It is purely your own.

If you want to discuss the meaning of the 2nd law of thermodynamics,
which makes reference to closed systems, then you need to learn the
meaning of that term AS IT IS USED by physicists.

> If no such experimental closed system has been
> observed, then I'm confused about why you are using an untested and
> unobserved concept to "prove" the existence of forward-flowing time.
> 
> 
>> What? Why? Continuousness does not imply isotropy. Anisotropy does not
>> imply discreteness.
> 
> I think you'll find it does. But if you have some examples where there
> is both continuous-variability and anisotropy, then perhaps we can
> discuss them.

Of course! The electric field surrounding a charge dipole is
continuous. But it is anisotropic.
Believe me, this is just one example.

> 
>>>>> Another epicycle is the
>>>>> forward flow of time - it forces us to deal with "time travel", "worm
>>>>> holes", "cause preceding effect".
> 
>>>> What is epicyclic abot any of these? I believe you are overlapping in
>>>> your mind "epicyclic" and "counterintuitive".
> 
>>> Now you put me on the spot, I suppose I'm suggesting that they are
>>> indeed one and the same.
> 
>> Then you have misunderstood the meaning of epicyclic.
> 
> No, I've explained before about the epicycles in the geocentric model,
> and how astronomers became exasperated with the ever-increasing
> complexity and counter-intuitiveness of the model (for example, some
> stars did not orbit, but simply oscillated in the sky). Thus it is not
> clear why you would say that I don't understand my own figurative
> meaning.

That is NOT what epicyclic means. It does NOT mean overcomplex and
counterintuitive.
See what I wrote about this above.

> 
> Perhaps it's more the case that you didn't understand my figurative
> meaning, possibly because you don't know a great deal about the
> history of the geocentric model, so it isn't obvious to you why I'm
> using "epicycles" to refer in a broad sense to "the parts of a whole
> model that has such great complexity that it strains credulity and
> defies intuitive understanding" - although I should add that the word
> "epicyclic" has been used more than I would have chosen to use it here
> simply because you have asked me a number of times why something is
> epicyclic. That is perhaps my fault though for not realising earlier
> that you didn't understand what I actually meant by the word.

You have a lot of private meanings for terms that are used in physics.
The problem then is that you think the statements in physics mean
something other than what they do.

> 
>>> Anything that can be rationally understood,
>>> eventually becomes intuitive with practice.
> 
>> I completely agree with that. And there is nothing counterintuitive
>> about relativity or gravitation or quantum mechanics that isn't
>> resolved with practice.
> 
> There is nothing counter-intuitive about gravity or relativity,
> because it involves concepts we are familiar with in our daily lives.

Are you familiar in your daily life with gravitational lensing,
anomalous precession of planets, and event horizons?

> As for quantum mechanics, I think what you mean is that there are some
> people who know the theory very well. That is not practical intuition.

This does not mean that there is not practical intuition about quantum
mechanics. Only that you don't have any of it yet.

> 
>>> And since
>>> the maths is supposed to be a description of the physical world, the
>>> conclusion one must reach where modern physicists understand their
>>> mathematical descriptions but not the physical world, is that their
>>> descriptions do not actually describe the physical world (even in an
>>> idealised way)!
> 
>> The PHYSICAL models describe the physical world, and the mathematical
>> casting of the physical model is what allows physicists to make
>> testable predictions.
> 
> You can have a mathematical model with testable predictions, without a
> physical model.

But that's not the case with quantum mechanics.

> Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is an example of
> this.

On the contrary. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is a statement
about physical meaning.

> It is non-deterministic, and it doesn't purport to explain why
> the underlying mechanism cannot be determined.

OK, first off, I have to ask you WHY you think that any physical model
MUST be deterministic. That is, it is your belief that any model that
accurately describes nature MUST be deterministic at root, with the
implication that nature itself MUST be deterministic. WHY do you
believe that?

> The gas laws are
> another example where there is a statistical element, but unlike
> Heisenberg's uncertainty we have an explanation for the underlying
> mechanism of action of the gas laws.
> 
>>>> Whether you believe it or not is not really relevant. What matters is
>>>> whether there is any evidence that it is fundamentally reversible.
>>>> This is where observation plays a key role and what separates physics
>>>> from philosophy.
> 
>>> Science does have a philosophy you know.
> 
>> But it invokes things that philosophy does not, and this is the part
>> you ignore.
> 
> Such as?

Experimental test!

> 
>> And you are the one that is complaining about nonintuitive ideas like
>> wormholes, etc.
> 
> No, I'm complaining about ideas like wormholes (or singularities,
> classical time, etc.) that remain counter-intuitive even after
> exposure to the concept.

I'm sorry, but there's nothing counterintuitive about wormholes or
singularities or classical time. Just because YOU have difficulty
being comfortable with the concepts doesn't mean that experience is
shared. A little humility, please.

> 
> Even the twins paradox was immediately reconciled with my intuition
> when I realised that the astronaut accelerates more - and yet, for
> hours of searching for information, nowhere did I see such a simple
> explanation offered, and instead I read all kinds of nonsense about
> "changing reference frames".

It's not nonsense. It's IMMEDIATELY clear to me and to students
worldwide EVERY DAY what's going on in the twin puzzle. That's the
POINT of the twin puzzle -- to provide that insight. I'm sorry that
hasn't settled on you yet.

> 
> I ended up falling back on my own practical intuition that the
> asymmetry is because a rocket engine does not cause the Earth to
> accelerate as much as the rocket, and only then did someone here say
> "oh, yes, you can explain it based on acceleration, but it's easier to
> explain with the reference frames". And my answer is that it isn't
> easier at all - the reference frames solution may be a mathematical
> simplification, but it breaks the link with the physical mechanism.
> And once I made the link with acceleration, it became easy to
> understand why changing your position in a gravitational field also
> causes the same effect.

Then I'm afraid you haven't had it explained properly to you in a way
that you can understand and still be correct.
That is not the fault of relativity. It is simply the result of you
being isolated from proper exposure to the physics. This is a matter
of choice on your part to correct.

> 
>> Please do not tell scientists how science should be done. Science is
>> DEFINED by the activity of scientists.
> 
> That's strange, I was led to believe earlier that you thought the
> activity of scientists was defined by science, not the other way
> around.

No, I didn't say that.

> If science is defined merely as "what scientists do", then
> that is a bulletproof rejoinder to anyone who points out that what
> scientists are regularly doing is not at all in accordance with the
> commonly-apprehended principles of science.

Then perhaps the "commonly-apprehended principles of science" are
misapprehensions, eh?
If you want to know what science is, ask a scientist. If this
conflicts with your common apprehensions, then consider those
corrected.

> 
>>> The notion that has been
>>> wrongfully dislodged in modern physics is that idea that mathematical
>>> models have to be described in physical terms, where you can
>>> understand the mechanism of action mechanically.
> 
>> Oh, wait a second. If you mean that the universe and all its processes
>> should be reducible to the familiar, macroscopic, time-ordered
>> phenomena exposed to your senses, then I have to draw the line. The
>> universe is much richer than what we once understood with cogs and
>> particles and levers and fluids. Any attempt to reduce all of nature
>> to these rather quaint but limited notions is doomed to failure,
>> simply because nature is more interesting than that.
> 
> You'd be surprised how much this statement says about you. Science is
> the investigation of how nature works as a deterministic system.

Uh, NO! NO, NO, NO.

> But
> you think a simple system is a cold system, and you prefer complex
> adornments to simple efficiency. I can see why you like modern
> physics!
> 
> 
> 
>> I'm afraid you don't understand the reductionist methodology of
>> scientific modeling. Would you like a reference on the methodology of
>> science, something on the philosophy of science perhaps, so that you
>> stop making it up to suit you as you go along?
> 
> You couldn't make it up. If you want to discuss the "reductionist
> methodology of scientific modelling", then do so. I've said my part on
> this issue above, that there is a difference between a theory whose
> accuracy is only limited by practical implementation, and a theory
> whose accuracy is self-limiting - the latter theory is already beyond
> its conceptual shelf-life (except, perhaps, where it suffices for
> practical purposes).

I'm sorry, but the body of scientists would vociferously disagree with
you.


> 
>> Do you need some Google pointers?
>> Since you're a hobbyist, I could suggest a book by a woman at Harvard
>> who wrote it for laypeople for just that purpose.
> 
> Yes, if you have some links then as I say I'd be interested to read
> more on the issue.

Lisa Randall's book for the lay public. She's only written one.

> 
>> No, I'm sorry. The onus is on the person who presents a new model to
>> use that model to cite predictions that distinguish it from other
>> models. That is how science operates, and with good reason.
> 
> But how does that work when the new model makes fewer unverified
> predictions in some respect than the existing model?

It doesn't make FEWER. It just puts some of those predictions out past
our accessibility. That makes it LESS useful.

> My model about
> relative time simply predicts that time is not navigable, and that
> "travelling to the past" in the classical sense is as meaningless

Traveling to the past is not supported in the present model, and so
your model offers no advantage here.

> in
> the physical world as "going to Hell" - in that it is not a place to
> which one can navigate by resort to any physical process, if indeed
> such a place exists materially at all.
> 
> 
>>> The question is whether any coherent theory requires it. I haven't
>>> heard any explanation yet for why the curvature of spacetime is
>>> distinguishable from forces acting acting on matter in the classical
>>> way in Euclidean space.
> 
>> Because they make different predictions of observable phenomena! You
>> aren't aware of these?
> 
> Indeed I'm not aware of any observable phenomena that cannot be
> trivially described in 3 dimensions. Even the effects of SR can be
> readily understood in 3 dimensions. Of course I'm willing to be
> corrected.

Wait a second. Let me see if I understand you. You are saying, "My
present understanding of nature requires only three dimensions. If
nature exhibits itself to require an understanding of more than three
dimensions, then I'm not interested in such a model. That is, nature
must conform to MY current parameters of understanding, and I will not
accept any model of nature that does not accomplish that."


> 
>> Well, as it turns out, you may be interested in quantum eraser
>> experiments. You can google that.
> 
> I've studied it again now scrupulously and I don't find anything
> shocking about it (even though the last page I read 
>   http://www.bottomlayer.com/bottom/kim-scully/kim-scully-web.htm
> said as a layman I ought to be).
> 
> Surely the outcome of the QE experiment is easily understandable if
> you conceive of there being a sort of EM field (i.e. a potential
> force, that "charges" space) which is distinct from the photon (i.e.
> an energy packet causing observable change of state) itself? I know
> that sounds like going back to the luminiferous aether, but it's
> surely more physically credible that "action at a distance" or "a
> particle in two places at once".

When you can come up with a model that can quantitatively predict
those results like quantum mechanics can, rather than vaguely waving
your hands and saying "Surely something simpler can be made to
work..."

> 
>> You may also be interested in learning about the Feynman diagrams that
>> include non-strict-time-ordering that are required to correctly
>> predict the anomalous magnetic moment of the muon.
> 
> I'm afraid I couldn't make heads nor tails of the concept.

And this implies what about the physics? That it is wrong because you
can't make sense of it?