

# Linking of Repeated games. When Does it Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements? CORRECTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTS

P. v. Mouche

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## Corrections:

1. *Page 3, line 16*  $\uparrow$ :  $\dots := \sum_{k=1}^M k f^j(*x^1, \dots, *x^N)$ .
2. *Page 3, line 14*  $\uparrow$ :  $\dots := {}_1U + \dots + {}_M U$ .
3. *Page 4, line 6*  $\downarrow$ : If each  ${}_k \Gamma$  is regular, then  $\dots$
4. *Page 4, line 11*  $\downarrow$ :  $\dots$  Again, let  ${}_1 \Gamma, \dots, {}_M \Gamma$  be  $\dots$
5. *Page 7, line 6*  $\uparrow$ :  ${}_k \Gamma = \pi_k({}_1 \Gamma)$  ( $k \in \mathcal{M}$ ).  $\dots$
6. *page 8, line 5*  $\downarrow$ :  $\dots$  that the game has a Nash equilibrium and is symmetric and  $\dots$
7. *Page 9, line 11/12*  $\downarrow$ : delete the parentheses and the text inside them.
8. *Page 10, line 1*  $\uparrow$ :  $A, B \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow s(A+B) = s(A) + s(B)$ . (11)
9. *page 11, line 11*  $\uparrow$ :  $\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{y} \geq 0$  ( $\mathbf{y} \in B$ ). Because  $\dots$
10. *Page 12, line 15*  $\uparrow$ :  $\dots$  Therefore  $u \notin \text{PB}_w(H_\alpha)$ .
11. *Page 12, line 17*  $\uparrow$ :  $\dots$  also does not  $\dots$
12. *Page 12, line 19*  $\uparrow$ :  $\dots$  with  $u \in \text{PB}(H)$ .
13. *Page 12, line 19*  $\uparrow$ :  $\dots b_i := x$  where  $x \geq a_i, \dots$
14. *Page 13, line 6*  $\uparrow$ :  $\dots (T_{\pi_k}(n)) = \dots$

Comments:

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Further reading:

If you think that some other things should be added here, then please let me know.