Last updated: 10/11/2018
1815: Wargaming the Waterloo Campaign


 
Expansion Pack for John Tiller's Campaign Waterloo
   
by Hans Boersma



1. Introduction
2. Download
2.1 Scenarios
2.2 Parameter Data
2.3 Order of Battle
2.4 Music
2.5 Graphics (Optional)
3. Acknowledgments
4. Sources
5. Appendices
   A. Map of the Battlefield of Quatre Bras, October 1815
   B. Campaign of the Year 1815 by Lieutenant Colonel de Jongh
   C. The Uniform of the Nassau Volunteer Jäger Company
   D. Unit Icons for Battleground Prelude to Waterloo and Battleground Waterloo (Matrix Games)


What's New:
   
10/11/2018: Version 5. Added scenario 3.3. The French 4/2e Légère has been added to Bachelu's brigade as it had  inadvertently been deleted in the previous versions. Several Anglo-Allied units were found to be overstrength in the original oob file [Waterloo_June16.oob]; these strengths have been adjusted, as a consequence of which four units (in Best's brigade and the Brunswick Corps) have come unsplit. Von Kruse's Nassau Brigade has been corrected from division to brigade. A list of changes is included in the zipfile. Updated 2.5 Graphics (Optional).


1. Introduction
   
The expansion pack contains scenarios (.scn), parameter data (.pdt), order of battle (.oob) and submap (.map) files for the computer wargame Campaign Waterloo. At present it includes nine scenarios covering the engagements at Frasnes and Les Quatre Bras on the 15th and 16th of June 1815. The .pdt and .oob files modify gameplay, but only for these scenarios. This website basically forms the package leaflet, explaining what has been done and why, as well as providing some background information. 
   
Campaign Waterloo is a turn-based computer wargame by HPS Simulations and John Tiller Software. I do not represent these companies and the files offered here are not in any way supported by them. I am not responsible for the unlikely event that the use of files downloaded from this website causes damage to 
computers or software
   
Your comments or questions are welcome.

Hans Boersma
October 2018

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2. Download
   
To download, click here. Extract the zipfile to your Campaign Waterloo folder. This folder might be located at C:\John Tiller Software\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\HPS Simulations\. If your game is installed in a different location, unzip the file to the Campaign Waterloo folder there. No original game files will be overwritten. It may be a good idea to make sure you have updated your game to the latest version (1.0.7). The files contained in the zip file are described in detail below.

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2.1 Scenarios 

The scenarios come in three sorts: Historical, Variant and Manoeuvre. In the historical scenarios I have done my best to schedule and deploy the units of both sides as historically accurate as possible, taking into account the abstractions and inaccuracies of the game map and the effects of a turn-based game sequence. The two other categories depart from the historical situation: Variant scenario's explore "what-if" possibilities, whilst Manoeuvre scenario's offer players more freedom to deviate from history by starting before the actual battle.

1.0 Skirmish at Frasnes, 15 June 1815 (Historical), 13 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_1.0_Historical.scn]
   
In the early morning of 15 June 1815 Napoleon's Northern Army crossed the border of the newly created Kingdom of the Netherlands, pushing the forces of the Prussian I Corps out of Charleroi and Gosselies. The Prussians retreated eastwards and Marshall Ney, poised to drive a wedge between the Prussian Army (Blücher) on his right and the Anglo-Allied Army (Wellington) on his left, has ordered General Lefebvre-Desnouettes to advance his Guards Light Cavalry Division northwards to the village of Frasnes and reconnoitre the area. They reached the village early in the evening and ran into the outposts of Wellington's 2nd Netherlands Division: one battalion of Nassau light infantry and one battery of Dutch horse artillery. These performed a skillful fighting withdrawal towards the crossroads called Les Quatre Bras, the assembly point for their brigade in case of alarm.


1.1 Skirmish at Frasnes, 15 June 1815 (French Variant), 13 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_1.1_French_Variant.scn]

   
Although their primary mission was reconnaissance, Lefebvre-Desnouettes's cavalry division would have done well to bring up their artillery. For some reason this did not happen. With two batteries of horse artillery their brush with the Netherlands outpost might have turned out quite differently. Also, there is no indication that Lefebvre-Desnouettes used his Chasseurs à Cheval. With these restrictions removed the French side might be able to take the crossroads on the evening of the 15th.

2.0 From Frasnes Onwards, 15 to 16 June 1815 (Manoeuvre), 91 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_2.0_Manoeuvre.scn]
   
This scenario starts out as 1.0 Skirmish at Frasnes, but continues until nightfall on 16 June when, historically, the Battle of Quatre Bras had come to an end. All reinforcements arrive at their historical times and places, but after the historical set-up in the first moves both sides are free to deploy their forces as they see fit.

3.0 The Battle of Quatre Bras, 16 June 1815 (Historical), 30 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_3.0_Historical.scn]
   
Napoleon has ordered Ney to advance towards Brussels as far as Genappe. The fact that Ney finds De Perponcher's 2nd Netherlands Division in a blocking position is thanks only to the initiative of the Netherlands commanders taken in the previous night. The Prince of Orange, who arrived on the field at about 6.30 AM, has ordered Van Merlen's 2nd Netherlands Light Cavalry Brigade to Quatre Bras. The Duke of Wellington, who arrived at about 10 AM, has ordered his Army Reserve to the crossroads from the direction of Brussels. He inspected De Perponcher's positions until about 11.00 AM and is now on his way back from a meeting with Blücher at Brye. In the meantime Ney, after Foy's Division arrived on the field and moved into position, has ordered the attack. The Prince of Orange responds by calling in more reinforcements from the direction of Nivelles, whilst trying to keep at least one foot on the doorstep of the crossroads.
   
Note: What is wrong with the original, out-of-the-box historical Quatre Bras scenario [022.Quatre_Bras_h.scn]? Well, apart from some issues regarding unit placement, it has the following rather serious flaws:
   
- The Brunswick corps arrives before instead of after Picton's division
- From the latter, Best's Hanoverian brigade is missing; also missing is the divisional artillery (Rogers's and Rettberg's batteries)
Van Merlen's cavalry brigade arrives with six guns too many (should be two guns)
Von Alten's division arrives on the map from the direction of Brussels (north), which should be from Nivelles (west). Moreover it includes Von Ompteda's brigade, which was not present
Cooke's division also arrives from the direction of Brussels instead of Nivelles
D'Erlon's Corps does not arrive at all, even though the scenario runs to 11 PM
This also goes for Anglo-Allied reinforcements which arrived when the battle was coming to an end, such as Von Kruse's Nassau Brigade and Ponsonby's cavalry brigade
   
The cumulative effect of these shortcomings is that the original scenario fails to provide a reasonably accurate depiction of the historical battle.
   
Another note: It is uncertain whether Lefebvre-Desnouettes's horse artillery (two batteries) and Reille's corps reserve artillery (one battery) actually made it to the battlefield. Regarding the former there are indications that it didn't. As a compromise I included only the latter and scheduled it after Guiton's cavalry brigade
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3.1 The Battle of Quatre Bras, 16 June 1815 (French Variant 1), 30 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_3.1_French_Variant_1.scn]
   
The Battle of Quatre Bras was a meeting engagement in which both sides struggled to get the necessary forces on the battlefield. But why didn't Ney take the crossroads when he could? From 2 PM to 3 PM, facing only De Perponcher's division, he had a clear advantage both in numbers and in troop quality. Aside from a certain hesitancy on his part it is worth noting that Napoleon had restricted Ney's command right where his greatest advantage lay: his cavalry. Ney was not allowed to use the Guards light cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, whilst Guiton's brigade of cuirassiers only became available to him when Napoleon was satisfied that he didn't need it at Ligny. In this version of the battle the French side suffers no such restrictions.

3.2 The Battle of Quatre Bras, 16 June 1815 (Manoeuvre), 34 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_3.2_Manoeuvre.scn]

   
The French main attack developed at ± 2 PM. Its first stage was directed at De Perponcher's left wing (Lairalle-Piraumont area), as reflected in the set-up of the historical Quatre Bras scenario
(3.0). This version begins before the actual battle started to allow the French side to choose a different approach. It will become apparent that Ney's forces more or less marched straight off the road and into battle, just as the Allied reinforcements would later in the afternoon.

3.3 The Battle of Quatre Bras, 16 June 1815 (Allied Variant), 34 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_3.3_Allied_Variant.scn]

   
The Netherlands commanders attached great importance to the Bois de Bossu: they knew it would be difficult and time-consuming for the French to clear the wood, and whilst in possession of it Anglo-Allied forces would be able to at least threaten the free use of the crossroads. In addition the wood masked the arrival of Allied reinforcements from the direction Nivelles, where the bulk of the Prince or Orange's I Corps was. In the real event the Allied centre and left wing soon came under great pressure and nearly broke. How important was the Bois de Bossu? In this scenario De Perponcher has taken a more concentrated position and he has deployed his strongest brigade, that of Von Saxen-Weimar, on his left. Van Bijlandt's brigade defends the centre, the Bois de Bossu is left largely undefended in the expectation of reinforcements from the west. Like the previous scenario this version also starts earlier than the historical battle. 


3.4 The Battle of Quatre Bras, 16 June 1815 (French Variant 2), 30 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_3.4_French_Variant_2.scn]
   
The Dutch researcher Pierre de Wit argues, we believe convincingly, that it was not Napoleon who ordered D'Erlon's corps to Ligny, but rather that D'Erlon marched in that direction on his own initiative. He would have taken this action after being informed about the order Ney received around 
3.30 PM, in which Napoleon ordered Ney to wheel right at Quatre Bras and attack the Prussian right wing at Ligny ("The fate of France is in your hands"). The wargaming evergreen of D'Erlon joining the Battle of Quatre Bras does not become more likely in this light, but it is offered here for your entertainment. 

3.5 The Battle of Quatre Bras, 16 June 1815 (Variant), 30 turns
[HB_Quatre_Bras_3.5_Variant.scn]
   
Continuing on the path of limited likeliness, in this variant not only D'Erlons corps joins the battle, the Allies call up more reinforcements as well. What they need most is cavalry, so the remainder of De Collaert's Netherlands Cavalry Division, which is closest by at Arquennes, is ordered to march to the crossroads as soon as the French attack develops in earnest. Chassé follows in the wake of Von Alten's division, leaving Nivelles undefended.
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2.2 Parameter Data
[HB_Quatre_Bras.pdt]

   
Compared to the original parameter data file [waterloo_campaign_new.pdt] the following changes have been made:
   
The clock has been adjusted to local time. Dawn now starts at 2.45 AM (was 2.30 AM), dusk starts at 8.15 PM (was 9.30 PM), twilight lasts one hour (was two hours). Source:
De Koepel Observatory, Utrecht. Because night turns last 1 hour dawn may start too late, depending on what time the scenario starts. However, dusk was a more important factor in this campaign than dawn: the French weren't exactly early risers in June 1815.
    
The fatigue recovery values have been lowered from 15/75 (day/night) to 0/75, in order to better reflect what the game's user manual says on the subject:
   
"Fatigue is used to represent combat fatigue, not the physical state of being 'winded'. The physical effects of combat fatigue are felt long term and do not wear off through simple rest. In many Napoleonic War battles, the end of the battle was determined by fatigue and not by losses. In larger battles, commanders had to be careful to rotate their fighting units and not commit any one force too long to battle. Having higher Fatigue recovery rates would permit the unrealistic ability for commanders to rest units for short periods of time and then recommit them to battle, something that was not common historically."
   
The original values are still much too lenient, however. When I playtested the large Manoeuvre scenario (2.0) I found that by turn 82 there was only one single unit with High Fatigue on the map, even though overall losses had mounted to some 8,500 men. Most units had Low Fatigue or none at all. I played against the A/I in its most aggressive mode which meant that the French just kept on coming. In one particular situation two Allied batteries fired at three French battalions in column, stacked in one hex, at a distance of one hex. In two or three turns the artillery had blown away more than half of the French infantry's strength (32, 54, 55% left) but the latter's fatigue remained remarkably low (342, 255, 521 on a scale of 900). What would clearly be in order is an increased fatigue accumulation, but this is not possible through the pdt file. It would be possible to lower the maximum fatigue level from 900 to, say, 600, but then there would be nothing between Medium Fatigue and Maximum Fatigue. So the only way to address this is by reducing fatigue recovery. I
t should be noted that the recovery values are not percentages, despite the game's F2 menu. According to the manual a unit that has rested for one turn will shed a number of fatigue points, which number is a random value between 0 and twice the recovery value. Nonetheless, tests have shown that a daytime recovery value of zero, as applied here, will still recover some 20 fatigue points per unit in 8 hours of daytime rest (32 turns). For campaign scenarios this lowest recovery rate will be too restrictive, but here it helps to serve our purpose. The nighttime recovery value of 75 means that a full night of rest (6 hours/turns) is on average worth some 350 recovery points. A unit with High Fatigue (600-900) cannot hope to sleep it off in one night, and when a unit enters Medium Fatigue (300-599) you will need to consider its role in the remainder of the battle.
     
The chance of an infantry unit becoming low or out of ammo has been changed from 4% per turn for all sides to: French 6%, Prussian 7%, 
Anglo-Allied 8%. The original values provide an unreal overabundance of  ammunition which allows us mouse-clicking generals to merrily fire away without ever having to worry about ammunition. Historically it was common for a battalion to run out of ammunition after half an hour of sustained firing: two turns in game terms. Applying this would likely dampen our virtual thirst for battle, but these higher values at least make fire and ammunition management a more prominent part of the game. Especially for the Anglo-Allied side, as playtesting has shown that at 8% the positioning of ammunition wagons actually becomes an issue.In addition there are now less supply wagons in the scenarios: one per division, as a rule. Comparing scenario 3.0 to the original historical Quatre Bras scenario  [022.Quatre_Bras_h.scn] the Anglo-Allies have 5 instead of 8 wagons, the French have 6 (but really 4) instead of 9 wagons. The differentiation between the three sides aims to address the fact that the game engine does not differentiate ammo loss by formation, whilst it does differentiate firepower by formation. The French side is on the attack and will be predominantly using column formations, using less ammunition. The Prussian side fights both offensive and defensive, using both column and line formations. The Anglo-Allied side, being on the defensive, will be fighting in line a lot of the time, spending more ammunition. British infantry actually applied their firepower extremely selectively (and effectively), but the British formed only about 1/3 of the Anglo-Allied Army. Their Netherlands, Netherlands-Nassau, Brunswick and Hanoverian allies were more susceptible to a continental tendency to become engaged in prolongued but ineffective firefights.  These values were modified from Jason Cawley's work. 
   
The infantry extended line feature has been disabled by setting the required strength values high enough to ensure that no battalion of any side can go into extended line. This measure, taken in conjunction with the splitting of large battalions, is further discussed under 2.3 Order of Battle.

The stacking limit per hex for infantry has been lowered from 2000 men to 1400 men for infantry, and from 1000 to 700 for cavalry, in order to achieve more a historical deployment of forces. One can put 2000 men into a 100 x 100 meter field without too much trouble, but Napoleonic formations require more space to manoeuvre and change formation. The infantry limit of 1400 men ensures that the Prussians can still stack two infantry columns in one hex, though they may need to deploy their skirmishers.
      
• The cavalry divisor (for skirmishing mode) has been changed from 1/4 to 1/3 in order to reduce the number of very small cavalry units; after all, these units have zones-of-control (ZOC). Adopted from Rubén López.
   
• The number of maximum cavalry units in one hex has been reduced from 8 to 4 to discourage stacking lots of cavalry "skirmisher" units in one hex.
Adopted from Rubén López.
   
• The fanaticism morale bonus has been lowered from 2 to 1. It is presently only used for the Dutch 5th Militia Battalion (Quality C) at Quatre Bras; this unit proved steadfast at Gemioncourt because of good leadership rather than because of military capabilities. The battalion repelled four subsequent charges by Piré's cavalry, but was broken after most of the officers were killed.
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2.3 Order of Battle
[HB_Quatre_Bras.oob]
   
Battalions with a strength of 700 men or more have been split in two. This has been done primarily to achieve a more realistic frontage, and thus firepower per hex, for infantry in line.
It also decreases the number of oversized skirmisher units. After all, with 150 men in a ± 100 square meter hex there is not much opportunity to skirmish. A secondary reason is fatigue. Because fatigue is accumulated by absolute numbers rather than by percentage, large units suffer more from it. This seemingly drastic measure only affects the Anglo-Allied Army, since there are as yet no scenario's involving Prussian formations. And the French battalions are perfect to scale.
   
You might want to make some coffee, for I will now elaborate on unit frontage.

   
First of all we need to accept that this game much more resembles a game of chess than it resembles a close simulation of reality; there is a large amount of abstraction at work. Nonetheless a certain amount of scale and proportion needs to be maintained so that in the end the overall result is more or less realistic. More or less realistic in terms of time and space and, if possible, in terms of firepower and casualties.
   
The real frontage per hex (± 100 meters) of infantry in line would be ± 160 men (at ± 0.6 meter per man). Which is quite different from the 300 men that one of Von Saxen-Weimar's large Nassau battalions (900 men) can squeeze into 100 meters of frontage according to the original game settings. That is, if we pretend that they fight in a 3-rank line like the original values do; in reality they fought in a 2-rank line, which means 450 men per 100 meters, or a rather cramped 22 centimeter per man. But let's leave that aside for the moment. If we assume that all infantry are 3-rank, we arrive at a battalion size of (3 x 160 =) 480 men being able to form line in one hex. Taking into consideration the peculiarities of a map turned into a chess board, we add about half of that strength as an abstraction margin: 480 + (220) = 700. I
n reality all Anglo-Allied infantry fought in 2-rank line (probably with the exception of Von Kruse's Nassauers), but applying a splitting point of 480 men (160 x 2 + (160/2) = 480) would simply add too much units to the game, never mind being well on our way towards a company level game with 240-men half-battalions. So as another abstraction we accept that in terms of size all infantry is 3-rank infantry. To achieve a wider, more historical frontage players might want to leave one hex open between two (half-)battalions, covering four rather than three hexes with musketry and ZOC.     
   
The original game deals with large line formations through the extended line feature. Regrettably the game's handling of this feature is rather unbalanced: going into extended line from column takes two turns (half an hour), which is extremely long especially when we consider that going into extended line in fact merely represents going into line. Going out of extended line on the other hand, and forming square or column, takes only one turn (15 minutes). We might perhaps still want to accept this, and if we changed the extended line values
from 600 men (2-rank) and 800 men (3-rank) to something like 480 men (2-rank) and 700 men (3-rank), we would at least have dealt with the size issue. But there is yet another problem, one that would then become more prominent: the "shortened" line formation. This is a battalion in line that has enough men to go into extended line, but doesn't. A rather eccentric formation that can only be explained as the 4-rank line that only the British used, and then only on very few occasions, but including Waterloo. It would however be peculiar to maintain the extended line feature for the British so that they can not use it. For these reasons I decided to disable the extended line feature altogether and deal with the size problem through splitting battalions alone.   
   
Splitting has the merit of a simple and uniform solution that affects a limited number of units. The 700-men splitting point ensures that the resulting half-battalions, identified in the unit box as "[a]" and "[b]", still have enough strength to qualify as battalion-sized units. At the same time a player may want to think twice before deploying a skirmisher unit from a 350-men half-battalion, and turn to a proper light infantry battalion instead. The large light infantry battalions are now better represented with two formed units in reserve, which enables them to cover a wider frontage whilst, if used prudently, deploying a smaller percentage of their strength as skirmisher units.
   
In the end it is merely about accepting the consequences of the game's abstractions. The map is already divided, and it is only logical that the game pieces should fit in its divisions, otherwise there is no scale. So, is this an ideal solution then? Not really, but perhaps it is the best that can be done. A non-optional, properly functioning extended line feature for large battalions would still confront a French player with some amazing lateral movements: one moment you are directing your cavalry at a nice, juicy battalion in line, the next moment it is 100 meters to your left or right, in square. Splitting on the other hand produces
fully independent half-battalions that can each form square and may operate at great distance from each other. For what it is worth, the Netherlanders at Quatre Bras did indeed detach companies and groups of companies hither & thither, not necessarily in skirmishing order. But if so desired, a simple self-imposed rule would address this, for example allowing no more than one hex between sibling units, or none. Regarding the ability to form square, the anti-cavalry formation that such a half-battalion would apply should not be seen as a standard hollow square but as a closed square formed from a closed order column, or a smaller square of a more improvised nature.

A split battalion comprises two firing units, but also two targets: both firepower and vulnerability are divided in two. Disorder suffered by [a] is not suffered by [b]. On the other hand, command problems increase because there are more units (see further below). Half-battalions are weaker in melee, especially if used in line. For melee purposes there is now a bigger incentive to use columns and to stack units. Thus the choice between applying fire power as effectively as possible (line) and concentrating strength for solidity and thrust (column) has become more significant, which I think is appropriate.
       
With the extended line feature switched off the only remaining difference between 2-rank and 3-rank infantry is firepower. This is in fact welcome. As we have seen, all or nearly all Anglo-Allied Infantry fought in 2-rank line, not just the British and KGL as the original values suggest. But only the British and KGL infantry deserve the 150% fire effectiveness attached to the 2-rank line formation, and they therefore remain classed as such. The 2-rank formation now merely serves as vehicle to simulate the effectiveness of British fire tactics (selective, well-timed, well-levelled volleys at short range, usually followed by a bayonet charge). It would seem logical to use the British Musket and British Rifle weapons for this (see below), but only the 150% effectiveness produces 1,5 fire points at 2-hex range. Which is more than, but not double the firepower of a "normal" musket.
   
Given the fact that British and KGL infantry already fire at 150% effectiveness, the game's introduction of an extra powerful British Musket, firing at 200% effectiveness at 2 hexes and 140 % effectiveness at one hex, is definitively an overstatement of British fire tactics. They have been given back their normal muskets.
   
The same applies to the British Rifle which, with the double fire bonus, fires like a modern assault rifle. Normal rifles have been handed out once again.  
   
Colonel von Saxen-Weimar, now having almost twice the number of formed units in his brigade, has been handed something of a command problem. This is, however, not unhistorical. An extra deputy commander (Colonel von Dressler) has been added as a patch, which should at least help to rally routed units and add a bit of morale in melees. Similarly affected are Anthing's Netherlands Indies Brigade (not used at present) and, to a lesser extent, Bijlandt's brigade. These have also been given an extra deputy commander (Colonel Rancke and Lieutenant Colonel De Jongh respectively).
 
Cavalry regiments with a strength of 700 men ore more have also been split. This has less to do with frontage and more with the 700-men stacking limit for cavalry. Only two regiments are affected: the Brunswick Hussars and the 1st Hussars KGL.
   
Other issues:
   
The Netherlands Cavalry Division has been transfered to I Corps; it only came under Uxbridge's command at Waterloo.
 
Uxbridge's Cavalry Corps has been lifted from the Anglo-Allied Army Reserve and placed directly under Wellington.

Von Kruse's Nassau Brigade has been corrected from division to brigade.
 
In some scenarios the brigades of Van Bijlandt and Von Saxen-Weimar (Perponcher's division) have swapped artillery batteries to match the historical situation (divisional order of 7 May 1815).
      
The Netherlands horse artillery guns have been corrected from 9-pounder to 6-pounder type.
 
The Brunswick foot artillery guns have been corrected from 9-pounder to-6 pounder type.
 
     
The Brunswick Avantgarde Battalion has been corrected from Guards to Light infantry type; an "advance guard" is something different than a "guards" unit. The Brunswick guards unit, but only in name, was the Leib Battalion (Life Guards). They were more or less green troops and have therefore not been classed as Guards infantry.
   
 
To match the historical records the French divisions of Bachelu and Jérôme Bonaparte have exchanged regiments, giving Bachelu the light infantry regiment it had at Quatre Bras (2e Légère).
   
Likewise Best's
Hanoverian brigade has been transfered to Picton's Division.
     
Unit qualities (QL) have been revised along the lines of the New Setting Project (see Acknowledgements); in general the high-end ratings (above A) have been lowered one point. Some Netherlands units I found to be overrated, whilst in general I have tried to reflect the varied quality of their infantry. I was able to look at the following units in more detail:
   
The French artillery at Quatre Bras is described as superior by sources from both sides. Some French batteries have therefore been upgraded from QL B to QL A.
   
The Netherlands 27th Jäger Battalion was a young unit, reported to be still behind in training, notably in skirmishing. Of the total strength of 809 men, 182 men had combat experience (22%), probably mostly officers and NCO's. Its rating has been lowered from QL B to QL C.
   
Von Kruse's 1. Nassau Regiment was formed in April/May 1815 and consisted for 4/5 of recruits. The time available was used for some intensive basic drill, however. The regular I. and II. Battalion have been rated QL C and D respectively (was QL B), the Landwehr Battalion has been rated QL E (was QL C).
   
The II. Battalion/Orange-Nassau Regiment, formed in April 1815, was almost entirely filled with recruits from the battalion depot and called-up Landwehr. In addition it structurally lacked ammunition: the battalion had French muskets, whilst the standard infantry weapon of the Netherlands Army was the British "Brown Bess" musket which had a larger calibre. The battalion was basically kept in reserve both at Quatre Bras and Waterloo. Its QL rating has therefore been lowered from B to D.

Note: A nice way to simulate this particular ammo problem would be to add a new weapon to the "weapons.dat" file: a musket with a maximum range of just one hex. I have not done this as I did not want the Expansion Pack to overwrite any original game files.
   
The 
Nassau Volunteer Jäger Company was not some crack light infantry unit. It was most likely composed of foresters, woodsmen, hunters, et cetera, who apparently brought their own rifles (later described as "rifled carbines" by Von Saxen-Weimar). When the company was raised in 1814 it was however stipulated that it should get picked officers. Its rating has been lowered from QL B to QL C. See also Appendix B.
   
For the same reason this unit has been reformed into three skirmisher units. Fielding them as a 175-men formed unit, with a ZOC, that can deploy five 29-men skirmisher units, is rather excessive. 
   
Also to avoid very small skirmisher units the strengths of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions/95th Rifles (II Corps) have been leveled out somewhat.
   
A 25-men cavalry unit, Guides te Paard, has been added to Anglo-Allied I Corps as an escort for the Prince of Orange in the Manoeuvre scenarios. The Mounted Guides were a 60-men reconnaissance and communications unit which during the Waterloo Campaign was dispersed over the various headquarters of Anglo-Allied I Corps. It appears they were mostly used as dispatch riders and escorts. The unit comprised picked cavalrymen with at least eight years of active service. It has however been rated QL B rather than QL A, as it is not supposed to be used as a combat unit.
   
The other "Staff Officers" and "Escort" units have likewise been given a uniform strength of 25 men and a QL B rating.  These units serve only to protect commanders who are in vulnerable positions or might otherwise feel undressed when entering the map. When their main forces are in place the escorts are withdrawn.

Unit names are displayed in their own language. Because the available space in the unit box is deplorably small, historical names are not possible and abbreviations cannot be avoided. Regarding the Netherlands Army, the labels "Dutch" and "Belgian" have been deleted since such designations were not part of unit names. To make the distinction Belgian units have their name displayed in French, being their dominant language at the time: so "2e Linie" is Dutch and "7e Ligne" is Belgian. Note "karabiniers"/"carabiniers" (Dutch/Belgian).
    
Finally it should be noted that the order of battle file is a working document and should not be used for organisational reference; for example, several units are included more than once to serve different situations.
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2.4 Music

   
Although the Netherlands provided about
1/3 of Wellington's Anglo-Allied Army, the game's music folder does not include a single piece of Netherlands music. With the addition of Mars voor de gezwinde pas (Swift Pace March) and Vuren (Fire) from Marschen en Signalen voor de Tamboers en Pijpers van de Armee by Jacob Rauscher (1814) this can now be corrected: download here and unzip to your Campaign Waterloo\Music folder. Delivered in the appropriate plastic-fantastic sound.
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2.5 Graphics (Optional)
   
Attention: original files will be overwritten! If you don't have a game cd, back up your files. Comprising:
   
A modified units.bmp with some new and modified pictures. I made these from the original file so that the  same style is maintained. There are new unit portraits for Netherlands militia, jäger, horse artillery and the Orange-Nassau Regiment. Also included are modified supply wagon portraits. The latter are not historically accurate: to make them more easily recognisable I gave them grey uniforms, after the uniform of Netherlands artillery train units. Download here and unzip to the Campaign Waterloo\Info folder. 
   
An alternative modified units.bmp with a unit portrait for the Nassau Volunteer Jäger (after Peter Wacker's tentative description). Only for the scenarios offered here: if used with the original scenarios the 2. Regiment Nassau will unfortunately all look like volunteer jäger. Download here and unzip to the Campaign Waterloo\Info folder.
   
A modified leaders.bmp with some new portraits for Netherlands commanders. The original file is, frankly, a mess and would need to be rebuilt from scratch: some leaders have the wrong portrait, some share a portrait, some portraits of known commanders are used for "Colonel Anonymus". As a consequence some Netherlands unit portaits end up being used by British and perhaps even Prussian commanders, so you might not want to install this. If you do, download here and unzip to the 
Campaign Waterloo\Info folder.
   
A cleaned-up and more business-like interface. Only the horizontal settings ("top" and "bottom") are provided for. Download here and unzip to the Campaign Waterloo\Info folder. 

   
A new cover picture, with sound file. The picture is modified from a watercolour by Jan Hoynck van Papendrecht (1858-1933), showing Colonel von Saxen-Weimar conferring with his staff at Quatre Bras in the early evening of Thursday 15 June 1815 (the colonel is in the foreground on the left, erroneously shown in the uniform of the 2. Nassau Regiment instead of the Orange-Nassau Regiment. Also he is really a bit too old here). The sound file comprises the opening bars of Short Ride in a Fast Machine by John Adams (*1947). Picture: download here and unzip to the Campaign Waterloo folder. Sound: download here and unzip to the Campaign Waterloo\Media folder.   

   
Together with the terrain mod made by
EZJax the game will look like this:


     
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3. Acknowledgements
   
Many
of the modified parameter data and order of battle values are inherited from or inspired by the old New Settings Project, which aimed to improve the Talonsoft Napoleonic Battleground games. In this project I collaborated with Jason Cawley and Rubén López (2000-2002). Especially the former provided me with a steep learning curve regarding game mechanics. Also inherited from this were outdated assumptions about British fire tactics, which I was made aware of by Geoff McCarty. Pierre de Wit was most helpful in answering some questions about the 1815 campaign. Sjak Draak helped me to increase my understanding of Napoleonic infantry formations. Bill Peters was helpful with stacking limits. The image used for the header of this page shows the outstanding graphics mod made by EZJax.
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4. Sources
   
My main source for the scenarios has been Pierre de Wit's excellent website The campaign of 1815: a study. In addition I consulted the following publications:
   
M. Adkin: The Waterloo Companion, The Complete Guide to History’s Most Famous Land Battle (London 2001)
 F. de Bas: Prins Frederik der Nederlanden en zijn tijd, Vol. IV (Schiedam 1904)
F. de Bas and J. de T’Serclaes de Wommersom: La Campagne de 1815 aux Pays-Bas, d’après les rapports officiels Néerlandais (Bruxelles 1908)
H. Boersma: A Concise History of the Battaillon Jagers Nº 27 in the Waterloo Campaign, 1815, Part I (NWC Newsletter 16, 2001)*
F. Brandes: Mit den Geschützen des schwarzen Herzogs nach Brabant! (Braunschweiger Artillerie vom Jahre 1809-1815, Teil 2) (Brunswiek Historica)
J. Franklin: Waterloo, Netherlands Correspondence, Volume One, Letters and Reports from Manuscript Sources (Ulverston 2010)
P. Hofschroër: 1815, The Waterloo Campaign, Wellington, His German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras (London 1998)
R. MacArthur, Squares and Oblongs (Blog)
G. Nafziger: Imperial Bayonets, Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as Found in Contemporary Regulations (London 1996)
B. Nosworthy: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies (London 1997)
P. Wacker: Das herzoglich-nassauische Militär 1806-1866 (Taunusstein 1998)
G. van Uythoven: Foot Artillery Officers of the Netherlands Serving from 1813 to 1815 (The Napoleon Series)
G. van Uythoven: Horse Artillery Officers of the Netherlands Serving from 1813 to 1815 (The Napoleon Series)
G. van Uythoven: Netherlands Artillery Equipment and Train during the Waterloo Campaign (Home Page)

* Recent research has established that the battalion flag shown in this article was not orange but green, and that it was not used in the 1815 campaign.
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5. Appendices
   
A. Map of the Battlefield of Quatre Bras, October 1815
   
Scale 1:10,000. Elevation lines per 1 to 5 metres. Copied from De vorming van het Nederlandsche leger na de omwenteling van 1813 en het aandeel van dat leger aan den veldtocht van 1815 (Breda: Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 1900) by W.E.A. Wüpperman. Based on the "Map of the battlefields of Waterloo and Quatre Bras. Recorded by order of Major-General Van der Wijck, commander of the Field Engineer Brigade, on 1 October 1815, No. 17, under the direction of Captain Engineer Schuller, by the 1st Lieutenant Engineers Brade and Backer Seest."
   
It is hard to understand why this map, based on a map made by military engineers only four months after the battle, has not been used as the single source for this area of the game map. See also this 2001 article. It is especially significant for the Bossu Wood, which was cut down in 1839. Most maps of later date, for instance the one in Siborne the Younger's Waterloo Letters (1891), appear to show the wood with the southern part already cut down. One can compare the Schuller map with the game map for one's self, but here are the main issues as I see them:
   
The shape and size of the Bossu Wood (see also this article)
The Grand Pierrepont farm is located too far to the south (this can be verified on Google Earth; it should be only slightly more south than the Lairalle farm). This also applies to the Petit Pierrepont farm
The Pierrepont (Odomont) stream extends too far beyond Grand Pierrepont
The Grand Pierrepont farm might need a chateau hex rather than a village hex. For the Lairalle farm and Pireaumont on the other hand chateau hexes are less than obvious. The wall around Pireaumont is quite extraordinary
To the east and south-east of Grand Pierrepont there are two roads missing
The northern part of the De la Hutte Wood is much too close to the Lairalle farm
There were no buildings in the south-eastern corner of the crossroads, and there is no justification for the chateau hex in the north-eastern corner
Though a straight line may well become bendy in hex-translation, the Brussels-Charleroi road should clearly be as straight as possible. The bend in the road north of Gemioncourt for example (see the screenshot above) makes this area easier to defend than it should be
   
Not as useful as reference because of its earlier date, but very beautiful, is the 1777 Ferraris map, which can be seen here.

B. Campaign of the Year 1815 by Lieutenant Colonel de Jongh
   
Account of the Battles of Quatre Bras and Waterloo by Lieutenant Colonel W.A. De Jongh, commander of the 8th National Militia Battalion. First published in De Nieuwe Militaire Spectator (Nijmegen 1866) as Veldtocht van den Jare 1815. Historisch verhaal. 
© Translation from Dutch by Hans Boersma, 2002. No copyright infringement intended. The original continues to include the operations in France up to July 1815. In the translation I preferred to stay close to the original, leaving the spelling of names and the (non-) use of capitals unaltered, and accepting that some of the wording may sound peculiar in English.

1st Brigade 2nd division of the mobile royal Netherlands army.
8th Battalion national militia.

Historical Account.

At 4 hours in the afternoon of june 15th I received the order to break camp from the cantonments at Bornival and Montreuil with my subordinate battalion, and to go to the common alarm assembly point outside the gate De Soignie in Nivelles, where I arranged the battalion at 5 hours, remaining there in bivouac.
   
In the morning of the 16th, at around 2 hours, I received the order by the aide de camp count Van Hogendorp to report to his excellency the lieutenant-general commanding the division, who ordered me to defile with my battalion through Nivelles in the utmost silence and to join up with the battalion jäger nº. 27, which H.E. had already put on the march, in order to take position at Quatre Bras. H.E. the lieutenant-general charged me with the command over both these battalions, and ordered me to place myself under the orders of his highness prince Bernard of Saxen-Weimar, commanding the 2nd brigade of the division. At 4 hours in the morning I arrived with both battalions at the position of Quatre Bras, and received order by the said prince to have the 27th battalion jäger take position forward and left of the road to Frasnes, relieving there a battalion Nassau, which had stood there during the night, in view of the enemy.
   
After this had been done, the prince charged me to place my battalion in reserve behind the houses of Quatre Bras, in which position it remained until about 2 hours in the afternoon, when major Amerongen, aide de camp, in compliance with orders of H.E. the division general, directed my battalion forward off the road, in front of the Bossu wood, and placed it in a sort of hollow road, adjoining with my right wing on the left wing of the battalion Orange-Nassau, which was already arranged in line. After having stood here in line also, under the fire of an enemy battery of three pieces, I saw the battalion Orange-Nassau, in which a sudden panic emerged, walk backwards; I was positioned in front of the centre of my battalion, and my right flank-company was being pushed in disorder by the battalion Nassau; I spurred my horse, and assisted by the good captain Sijbers, acting adjutant-major, I immediately brought my company back in line. I discovered that the Nassauers had been frightened by his royal highness the prince of Orange who, accompanied by staff and orderlies, rode by before our line, under the firing of the enemy battery. An aide de camp of his royal highness brought me the order to place myself backwards against the Bossu wood; the cannon balls of the enemy artillery, of which the battalion, standing in the hollow road, had been covered, now began to fall into itself, by which the sergeant-major colour bearer and two N.C.O.'s of the colour-platoon were badly injured; a corporal and several men were shot dead and badly injured. Some confusion aroused in the battalion; I let it march forward by files on the right side, under the fire of three enemy pieces, made a short and business-like speech to the gentlemen officers and men, pictured before them the duties to king and fatherland, aroused their feelings of honour, and immediately there was the finest tranquillity. The major count van Stirum, aide de camp of his royal highness the prince of Orange, passed me the order to detach two companies to the left in front of the wood, for which I employed the 5th and the 6th company.
   
Subsequently I remained in this position with the four companies, exposed to the enemy cannon fire, by which some men were killed and injured. Said aide de camp again reported to me, in order to cast my battalion into the wood; in all decency I made complaints against this, suggesting to H.G. that this would be spoil for a battalion composed of young men, fighting in a wood, dispersed as skirmishers; and that I would rather march forward to take away the three enemy pieces that fired upon me. This report having been passed to his royal highness, I received further order by the colonel lord Somerset, to advance into the wood immediately; to traverse it and to oppose myself against the enemy attacks on the other side. At this moment the 5th and 6th company were engaged with the enemy in skirmishing order; I had the company commanders pass through a thick hedge into the wood, and the men following them in order subsequently, assembling the companies again on the other side of the hedge. I remained outside the wood with captain Sijbers until the entire battalion had defiled, abandoned my horse and placed myself in front of the battalion, traversing the tip of the wood. On the other side I found a part of the 7th battalion infantry of the line engaged with the enemy. I immediately started agitating with the four companies under my command, and chased back the French; as they got reinforced they attacked me in their turn, and fighting they pushed me back into the wood. At this moment I was injured in my left side by a piece of a howitzer shell and collapsed to the ground; I was instantly helped back on my feet again, as this injury had caused nothing but a heavy contusion. In the wood it was not possible for me to keep my troops in good order; the French, protected by strong artillery fire from the reverse of the wood, forced their way in; fighting, I slowly retired through the wood, unto the road between Hautain-Leval and Quatre Bras, closer to Quatre Bras, where I formed four companies and had myself bandaged; my adjutant-major took a cavalry horse from an officer of the Jäger who was retiring on his own; I was helped upon it and I marched to Quatre Bras, where I found the divisional and the brigade general, who placed me in column by platoons on the left wing of the corps of Brunswick troops. The general-major Van Marle had given me a saddle, which with the help of surgeon Wilson was put on my horse; then at that moment the surgeon Wilson was injured in his left leg by a piece of a howitzer shell (heavy contusion); this was a great loss for me and my subordinate battalion. This good officer had to leave the battlefield on the 15th, yet on the 18th, when the first enemy attack started, he came reporting to me, limping on two sticks; and during this bloody and honourable day he has fulfilled his duties with the finest zeal, by bandaging the injured on the battlefield. On the 16th at 10 hours in the evening the firing on the other side ceased. Bivouacked that night near Quatre Bras.

State of the losses on the 16th.
   
W.A. De Jongh, lieutenant-colonel, injured, contusion.
Wilson, surgeon, idem, idem.
3 N.C.O.'s killed.
24 men idem.
9 N.C.O.'s and men heavily injured.
37 idem idem lightly injured.
13 idem idem taken prisoner.
musket shots 9,650.
28 muskets lost.
16 cartridge pouches idem.
7 sabres idem.

The 17th,
   
At 4 hours in the morning the detached 5th and 6th companies rejoined the battalion. At 10 hours the division retired through Genappe and took position on the other side. At 2 hours in the afternoon broke camp and marched unto the wood of Waterloo; taken position in front of the Mont St. Jean, where we bivouacked that night. During the night a company flankers at 300 paces in the line of the advanced posts in front of the division. From the 17th in the afternoon until the 18th in the morning at 10 hours, incessant heavy showers; those days, being the 17th and the 18th, received no provisions, straw or fuel.
   
17th, no losses.

The 18th,
   
At nine hours in the morning, I received order to take position behind the hollow road, in the first line, adjoining my right wing on a battery of horse artillery and with my left on the battalion infantry of the line nº. 7; the left flank company was detached in front of the line in skirmishing order; the right flank company was detached to the centre of the English troops. Around twelve hours the first enemy cannon shots were fired. Near half past twelve the first line of the enemy, formed in columns, approached and pushed the skirmishers back onto the line, subsequently attacked the line, penetrated it, and threw the weak battalions pell-mell; at this moment the English cavalry cut in, and put to the sword a large part of the two columns that had forced our division. I immediately reassembled the largest part of my battalion, marched forward, supporting the attacks of the English cavalry and taking many French officers and soldiers prisoner. After this enemy attack had been rejected entirely, the chief of the general staff of the division gave me the order to place myself behind the hollow road in front of La Haye Sainte, in my previous position (a part of my battalion had let itself being drawn along taking the prisoners-of-war backwards); it was captain Sijbers, 1st lieutenant Werner, 2nd lieutenants La Ros, Tiele and Kanselaar who remained with me. Four of these officers were injured in the continuous attack which the enemy made upon us. As the brigade general was compelled to leave the battlefield because of his injuries, and lieutenant-colonel Westenberg, commanding the 5th battalion of national militia infantry — who, after the first enemy attack had been rejected, had taken up a position behind the third line with the debris of his Battalion (which was very small) — had become injured also, I, being the eldest commanding officer of the Brigade, took command and assembled the three battalions, nº. 7 and 8 national militia and nº. 7 infantry of the line. The first was being commanded by captain van Bronkhorst, as lieutenant-colonel Singendonk, because of an injury on his right hand, was compelled to leave the battlefield; the 7th battalion infantry of the line was commanded by captain Polus, the lieutenant-colonel Van Der Sanden having also left the battlefield backwards because of injuries. 1st lieutenant Noot and 2nd lieutenant count van Stirum, with about 26 or 27 N.C.O's and Jäger, applied to me, requesting to fight under my orders. At this moment the division general and the chief of staff were with the 2nd brigade. I united these various troops with my battalion, placed them in this position, and during the entire day held the position, supported by the English infantry commanded by lieutenant-general sir Picton, rejecting all enemy attacks and various times helping to throw back the French into the low grounds (ravine) in front of the position, all the time inflicting a dreadful massacre to the enemy. In these affairs I sustained heavy losses of dead and injured: of the 7th battalion infantry of the line one officer was killed, two injured; 1st lieutenant Werner and 2nd lieutenant Kanselaar badly injured, the 2nd lieutenant L.A. Ros lightly injured and captain Sijbers injured by a musket ball (heavy contusion) to the left arm.
   
Without conceitedness I dare to declare that lieutenant-general Picton has several times demonstrated to me his high approval for the courage and cold-bloodedness of my subordinates, promising me to report this to his royal highness the prince of Orange; unfortunately this distinguished and famous general was killed, almost near the end of the battle.
   
Near nine o'clock in the evening the fighting was coming to an end, and the men, worn out and fatigued, fell down on the ground; that night we bivouacked on the battlefield. On the 19th we marched to Nivelles, where we bivouacked; on the 20th we broke camp and marched to the environs of Seneff, bivouacking there; on the 21st to Trivierres. Receiving there the order from his excellency the lieutenant-general commanding the division to reform the five battalions of the 1st brigade into two battalions, I united the 27th jäger battalion and the 7th battalion infantry of the line into one battalion, and assigned command to captain de Crassier, the eldest officer; I formed the 5th, 7th and 8th national militia battalions into one battalion, putting it under the orders of lieutenant-colonel Singendonck. On the same day the Division broke camp, and by forced marches advanced unto Péronne; we arrived in the environs of that fortress on the 26th, bivouacking there; on the 27th we advanced into Péronne, and by order of H.E. the division general I took command of this fortress.
   
With the appropriate respect I requested to the lieutenant-general not to leave me behind the front of the Army, but to make me advance as well to help ending the holy war, as I presumed that the French would venture another battle in front of the capital, and I felt that we had deserved this joy by the conduct we had shown in the battle of the 16th and the 18th; his excellency answered me that there needed to remain troops in Péronne, and that he was most satisfied with the conduct displayed by the 1st brigade of the division, and that he had made the finest report of this to his majesty, and that he had requested rewards for all those who had made themselves known on the field of honour in a distinguished manner.
   
Afterwards I have several times addressed myself to his excellency the division general by dispatch, in order to let me rejoin the army in front of Paris with the two battalions (which did take place later).

State of the losses suffered on the 18th.
   
captain Sijbers, lightly injured, contusion;
captain Tompson, idem;
1st lieutenant Werner, heavily injured, succumbed to his wounds;
2nd lieutenant Kanselaar, heavily injured;
2nd lieutenant La Ros, lightly injured;
37 N.C.O's and men, killed;
17 " " , heavily wounded;
48 " " , lightly ";
26 N.C.O's and men, lost or taken prisoner.
66 muskets lost
82 bayonets id.
52 cartridge pouches id.
13 sabres id.
7,800 musket shots

On the 18th, being positioned in the hollow road behind La Haye Sainte, covered by a small embankment with some undergrowth, I had the wood of it cut down, keeping my battalion, arranged behind it in two ranks, lying down all the time in order to cover the soldiers for the enemy cannon fire; whilst the enemy column approached I let them rise up again once they could effectively reach the enemy with their musketry. I myself remained behind the battalion, on my horse, accompanied by the good captain-adjutant Sijbers, reflecting all the attacks made by the enemy on the centre and on the left wing, and became convinced of the fine bravery of the English troops; I have never witnessed finer cool-headedness and silence.
   
During the first attack of the enemy I dismounted a corporal of Napoleon's guard dragoons who wanted to charge me; I parried his blows and pushed my sabre into his side; captain Sijbers immediately mounted this horse (this horse suffered two injuries in the end, one canister ball in the breast and one musket ball in the right buttock). Repulsing the third enemy attack, during which we pursued the enemy until down in the ravine, I fell down with my horse; as my left leg had been tied to the holster-cap of my saddle, I could not free myself. The two brave sappers Van Corvel and Sondervang dashed forward to help me, saving my life, as it were; while Van Corvel was lifting me on my horse, helped by Sondervang, the former's head was smashed by a cannister ball, by which his brains splattered in my face and on my clothes. Captain Sijbers and 1st lieutenant Werner conducted themselves in a distinguished manner in both battles; 2nd lieutenants Kanselaar, Van Tiele and La Ros excelled as junior officers; and I especially mention the Officer of Health Wilson who, although injured on the 16th, rejoined me on the battlefield on the 18th, staying with the battalion all the time, suffering much pain because of the injuries he had sustained.
   
The captains Van Bronkhorst, Knol, Pheifer, of the 7th battalion national militia infantry, have excelled in the finest manner by encouraging the young soldiers in words and deeds, to help holding the field of battle and to carry away the victory.
   
The captains Polus and Nieuwpoort and the 1st lieutenant Vadder have distinguished themselves as well.
   
The 1st lieutenant Noot, 2nd lieutenant Van Stirum, of the 27th Jäger Battalion, who joined me voluntarily, have acquitted themselves in an excelling manner, losing two thirds of the detachment they commanded.

Péronne, the 15th July 1815, the first and true year of freedom.

The lieut. colonel, ad interim commanding the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division.

(signed) W.A. de Jongh.

C.  The Uniform of the Nassau Volunteer Jäger Company
   
Merely to make them recognisable I have used the Nassau grenadier icon for this unit, which was known
to themselves as the Freywillige Oranische Jägerkompanie. About their uniform there is hardly any information available. This great website supposes they wore the uniform of the 2. Regiment Nassau but of better quality, assumptions probably based on Coppens/Courcelle. I have however never seen any evidence for this. That these volunteers, probably hunters, foresters, woodsmen etc., would be rich enough to buy fancy uniforms also seems less obvious. In 2000 I wrote to Peter Wacker, author of Das herzoglich-nassauische Militär 1806-1866, asking if he had any information. He was kind enough to reply and wrote:
   
"Here the sources are still contradictory. Probably: green coat; collar, wings [shoulder rolls, HB], piping and cuffs (pointed in Polish fashion) bright yellow; yellow buttons; grey trousers. Yellow leather work; shako after Dutch model; Carabineers [? HB] fur busby with yellow pouch. Officers as Dutch Jäger? Shako with laced top band, rank-distinctives and wings in yellow metal, yellow gorget with coat of arms, orange [waist] sash. But: there are many questions open here!"    
   
My translation may be imperfect. The uniform described is much like that of the Dutch jagers, except for the Nassau leather work. During the campaign the company was attached to the Orange-Nassau Regiment, which  regiment had been incorporated in the Netherlands Army and had received the number 28 of the line. For this reason it wore Dutch-styled uniforms, contrary to the 2. Nassau Regiment which was only hired by the Netherlands. It may thus be that the volunteer jäger were also incorporated rather than hired, or that the Netherlands Army arranged for their clothing 
for practical reasons. More research is needed here.

D. Unit Icons for Battleground Prelude to Waterloo and Battleground Waterloo
   
Many a nightly hour was spent on these, many years ago. I think they can still hold their own and people playing the old Battleground games, now supported by Matrix Games, might have a use for them. They come with an order of battle file, leader portraits, a Quatre Bras scenario and some other files. It should all still work.
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This website © Hans Boersma 2018